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Toward Standards for Materiality(?)
William Holmes
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
The term "materiality" in accounting and auditing literature is variously
used in relation to misrepresentation, disclosure, segregation of extraordinary
items, and audit requirements. The original use in accounting was in relation
to misrepresentation and disclosure. If we can concentrate on these aspects of
materiality, I believe the findings will apply equally well to the remaining aspects.
This is the approach that has been adopted throughout this paper.
Some History of Materiality
In an artictle I recently wrote for the February, 1972 Journal of Accountancy,
entitled "Materiality Through the Looking Glass," I traced the history of the
use of the term materiality in American accounting and quoted examples to show
that the concept was already well established in the early 1900's. I pointed out
that the English Chartered Accountants who arrived in the 1880's and 1890's
had brought the concept with them, and I showed that the concept was inherent
in the provisions of the early British Companies Acts. I quoted the definition of
Lord Davey's committee relative to an 1895 updating of these acts that—
Every contract or fact is material which would influence the judgment
of a prudent investor in determining whether he would subscribe for the
shares or debentures offered by the prospectus.
1

The article pointed out that this type of definition was merely the old common law doctrine governing cases of misrepresentation and deceit applied to the
sale of securities, and Oliver Wendell Holmes was quoted to show that the
American Common Law paralleled the English Common Law in this respect.
The article also reviewed the accounting literature in America on the
subject of materiality, pointing out that the earliest articles on the subject date
from the 1930's. I surmised that prior to the 1930s accountants generally regarded the term in its legal context; as something for the courts to interpret and
not something over which accountants could claim jurisdiction.
The term materiality was increasingly used in "official" accounting literature
beginning with the 1930's. An "official" definition from the Securities Acts was
incorporated in the S-X Regulations published in 1940, and the term was also
used extensively in the early Bulletins of the American Institute. Despite this,
writers in the 1930's and 1940's still seem to have regarded the concept as a
child of law and only a foster child of accounting and asked for, at most, "a part in
any final determination of its meaning."
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The Search for Standards
Since the early 1950's a different mood predominates—a search for standards,
and a growing conviction that the accounting profession should be the one to
establish such standards. This "positivist" attitude has been best represented in
the writings of Sam Woolsey and Leopold Bernstein, who believed "standards,"
"official guidelines," and "border zones" should be established, and established
by accountants. In my earlier article I discussed this matter briefly in the light
of recent court decisions and articles by non-accountants and suggested that it
would be extremely difficult to establish meaningful standards which would
embrace "all the circumstances"—to quote the judge in the BarChris case. Robert
H . Montgomery recognized the problem succinctly in his 1940 sixth edition,
which took account of the impact of the Securities Acts, when he said—
The auditor who examines a balance sheet to be included in a registration statement must decide for himself what the mental processes of the
"average prudent investor" might be! (The final punctuation is expressive.)
2

As I see it, the chief difficulty in establishing standards for materiality lies
with the common law doctrines of "influence" or "reliance." To quote Oliver
Wendell Holmes again—
It is said that a fraudulent representation must be material to have that
effect. But how are we to decide whether it is material or not? It must
be by an appeal to ordinary experience to decide whether a belief that
the fact was as represented would naturally have led to, or a contrary
belief would naturally have prevented, the making of the contract.
(Emphasis added)

3

The more modern Restatement of Torts says much the same thing.
A fact is material if its existence or non-existence is a matter to which
a reasonable man would attach importance in determining his course
of action in the transaction. (Emphasis added)
So we see that in the common law it is not so much the nature or extent of the
"fact" as the influence it had on the mind of a reasonable man in the particular
transaction, and, to quote the judge in BarChris, ". . . in the light of all the
circumstances."
Professor Louis Loss comments that many of the Blue Sky Laws carry forward the common law concept. With respect to the New York law, he says—
The offense is committed by material misrepresentation intended to
influence the bargain, although they may be due to negligence rather
than dishonesty. (Emphasis added)
4

The Securities Acts, where they apply, introduced a different doctrine in
that reliance on the misrepresentation is not always necessary—for instance under
Section 12(2). This may explain the different emphasis of the SEC definition
which—
. . . limits the information required to those matters as to which an
average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before purchasing the securities. (Emphasis added)
5
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I do not know whether the words "before purchasing the securities" carry
with them the thought of influence and reliability. However, if it is argued
that materiality has a different meaning under the Securities Acts than under
common law or under respective Blue Sky laws, the problem of setting standards
becomes doubly difficult. Presumably then materiality would mean one thing
for a large private placement of bonds and another for a public sale of common
stock under the SEC.
To quote Louis Loss again—
Inevitably, to be sure, some element of reliance is inherent in the concept
of materiality.
6

So we see that the concepts of "reliance" and "influence" coupled with the
requirement to look at "all the circumstances" lie at the heart of difficulties in
any attempt to establish accounting standards for materiality. The weight of the
accounting data as against the weight of other factors will vary case by case and
an accounting misrepresentation that would be material in one situation may
well not be material in another. The factors are entirely relative rather than
absolute. One wonders whether this dichotomy between relative and absolute
values could be at the heart of the disagreement between the Company and its
auditors on the one hand and the SEC on the other hand in the Occidental
Petroleum matter where, based on the figures given in the Wall Street Journal
report, the distortion of net income amounted to $8.9 million out of a total of
$174.8 million. We noted above the different emphasis of the SEC definition
of materiality.
My own opinion is that if we accept the term materiality with all its
attendant legal nuances—and I see no alternative to doing so—it becomes impractical to establish purely accounting standards for the term. I would suggest,
however, a practical alternative.
A Practical Alternative: Significant Distortion
The auditor's "certificate" states that the financial statements are fairly
presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. We have
no professional definition for the word "fairness," but it would seem to me to
be more of an intrinsic attribute of the financial statements themselves and less
dependent on the many factors involved in the term materiality. If we accept
this for the moment, we might establish standards to measure the point at
which financial statements per se might cease to be "fair"—a standard of "significant distortion" if I may coin a phrase. For instance, we might decide that
any distortion in the balance sheet in excess of say five per cent of total assets
would be "significant distortion" of the balance sheet, irrespective of the effect
in a particular instance on the average prudent investor. The income statement,
of course, poses more problems since the standard would have to embrace companies with regular income, companies with cyclical income, and companies with
a pattern of negligible income. It might be better to relate such a standard to a
theoretical income necessary to provide "normal" return on investment. To
cancel the effect of variations in debt/equity ratio as between companies it might
be advisable to measure the return on a base of total assets less current liabilities.
However, my purpose here is not to offer solutions as to how the standard would
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be defined but merely to set the stage. If we adopted such standards we could
then require disclosure action or qualification of the auditor's opinion for distortion in excess of such standard—even if materiality indicated a higher level. For
instance, turning again to BarChris, the 15.7 per cent difference in net income
might be "significant distortion" even although the judge ruled it was not material.
When materiality considerations suggested a factor lower than the "significant distortion" factor, the lower measure would take effect—a rule of
"lower of materiality or standard significant distortion factor." For example,
suppose we establish a 10 per cent factor for the income statement, and in a
particular case the company is on the verge of breaking through a "times interest"
coverage factor affecting its bondholders where a 5 per cent change in income
would spell the difference between interest covered and interest not covered. In
this case the 10 per cent standard distortion factor might have to give way to
the 5 per cent materiality factor.
It is fairly obvious that in those cases where the accounting misrepresentation
is the only factor involved which would influence the investor—i.e., ignoring
completely such things as nature of industry, size of company, history of stock
prices, changes in management, announcement of technology breakthrough,
acquisition of significant patents, discovery of new resources, environmental problems, the state of the national economy, and the international financial scene,
etc. etc.—then, ignoring all of these except the accounting data,
Materiality = Significant Distortion
This is the problem in evaluating the possibility of establishing materiality
standards from research studies based on case examples, such as those used by
Professor Woolsey in 1954. The responses were answers primarily to levels of significant distortion rather than to real life problems in materiality.
It is for this reason, also, that I do not like the latest (1968) English Institute
pronouncement that, "In an accounting sense a matter is material if its nondisclosure, misstatement or omission would be likely to distort the view given by
the accounts or other statement under consideration." I don't believe the term
materiality can be limited to "in an accounting sense." It may be said that any
decision by an accountant as to materiality in a particular case is always correct
short of a court of law. If the decision isn't challenged, then at least pragmatically,
the decision was a good one. The court will not limit its judgment to matters
"in an accounting sense." I believe the English Institute was seeking to isolate
the accounting misrepresentation in the manner I have suggested above and might
have solved the problem by recognizing this as "significant distortion" rather
than materiality. The English common law and the various Companies Acts
have always followed the "reliance" concept with its attendant "in the light of
all the circumstances," and I do not believe the Institute's latest definition is
meaningful since it obviously seeks to establish a concept of materiality based
purely on the accounting data.
7

Distinguishing Materiality and Significant Distortion
It may be suggested that the above arguments amount to no more than
splitting hairs on a matter of semantics. This may be so, but they are hairs of
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some importance and this distinction between materiality and significance is
somewhat overdue. In 1959 Carman Blough was saying—
Possibly these (reasonably informative disclosures; materiality; and
significance) are terms which defy definition . . .
8

and the need for the distinction is noticeable in paragraph .11 of the General
section of the Current Text of APB Accounting Principles, which states—
The committee contemplates that its opinions will have application
only to items material and significant in the relative circumstances.
(Emphasis added)

9

As things stand today I am not sure what distinction between the terms the
committee had in mind.
An interesting situation related to this matter of semantics is evident in
looking at the evolution of the present AICPA ethics rule governing misrepresentation. The earliest rule in 1917 used the word "essential," and in 1923 this
was changed to "essential and material" with respect to misrepresentation for
which disciplinary action could be taken. However, in both cases the rule was left
in the broad concept of looking beyond the financial statements in measuring materiality. The 1941 version of Rule 5, which has been readopted as Article 2.02
of the 1965 amendment, reads as follows:
In expressing an opinion on representations infinancialstatements which
he has examined, a member or an associate shall be held guilty of an act
discreditable to the profession if—
(a) He fails to disclose a material fact known to him which is not disclosed in the financial statements but disclosure of which is necessary to make the financial statements not misleading (emphasis
added)
(b) He fails to report any material misstatement known to him to
appear in thefinancialstatements
(c) Etc., etc.
It should be noted that paragraph (a) is aimed at the financial statements
themselves; paragraph (b) leaves the concept open for the concept of influencing
the investor. Paragraph (a) is "significant distortion;" paragraph (b) is
"materiality."
Proprietary Considerations
I believe we must take note of the legal origin of the term materiality. I
have pointed out before that frequent use of the term in accounting literature
does not establish for accountants a proprietary right to the term. The courts
would still try us subject to the legal concept of materiality if we had never
mentioned the word in accounting literature. Nor do I believe the courts would
be overly impressed with any standards we might adopt which looked only to
accounting data.
On the other hand the word significant is ours to do with what we will—
despite some use of the term in SEC literature. We can have significance "in
an accounting sense" and can set standards of significance if that seems desirable.
However, as I have pointed out above, the adoption of such standards does not
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absolve us from making a judgment also in each instance as to whether "in the
light of all the circumstances" materiality might not suggest a lower factor.
The question remains, if we adopt standards of significance, how do we
police our standards? For instance, how would we deal with those cases where
the courts rule that the "significant distortion factor" in a particular instance was
not material? This is not an easy matter to decide. However, the present ethics
rule with respect to mispresentation of material facts must be even more difficult
to apply until some court has made a decision. How, for instance, would the
Ethics Committee rule on the facts presented in Occidental Petroleum short of a
decision in the courts? It would obviously ease the problem somewhat if their
decision in a particular case was based only on the accounting data without the
need to examine "all the circumstances." It would seem to me, moreover, that
a judge would find a "standard of significant distortion" set by the accounting
profession a useful starting point in arriving at his decision in a matter involving
materiality. Here would be one factor quantified for him which he could weigh
against other factors in arriving at his decision.
Conclusions
Adopting a standard of significant distortion does not do away with the
problem of materiality, particularly where other factors indicate a lower level of
concern. I have stated that I do not believe we can "standardize" the measure
of such other factors. How, then, will the accountant deal with this problem?
The first thing is for the accountant to recognize the problem exists. I will
repeat a quote from an article written by Martin J. Whitman and Martin Shubik
in The Financial Executive, May 1971, which takes issue with the importance attached to net income by accountants as a factor in determining or influencing
stock market values:
The accountants, the regulatory authorities, and the so-called fundamentalists have taken a limited tool of analysis which is useful for appraising large, stable public utilities which enjoy little, or no, tax shelter;
which reinvest virtually all their retained earnings in their own industry; and whose common stockholders tend to be non-speculative and
dividend-income conscious; and they have assumed that this is either
the appropriate tool of analysis for almost all investor owned companies
or that everyone else thinks that it is an appropriate tool of analysis.
Many of us can remember the late 1950's when certain textile companies
with reasonable earnings were selling below book value so that management
found it advantageous to buy publicly traded stock into the Treasury to improve
earnings per share. The relationship between earnings and market value was
less than sensitive. The same can be said for many "start-up" ventures, the
cable-T.V. companies being an excellent example in the first four or five years
of their existence, when they are building their base load connections. At the
other end of the scale are the established "high-flyers" where the market has
discounted the future on the basis of an annualized coumpounded rate of growth.
The stocks of such companies are significantly more sensitive to any failure to
meet the expected earnings. I believe the accountant must make some evaluation
of these investor behavioral patterns in assessing a materiality—as distinct from
"significant distortion"—decision.
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The example I cited earlier with respect to "times interest coverage" with
respect to utility bonds suggests another area of sensitivity where contractual
clauses of debt agreements impose restrictions of one kind or another on additional borrowing powers, freedom to pay dividends, etc. In marginal situations
such restrictions may well influence a materiality decision. The accountant can
surely be cognizant of these factors as they arise. I have attached as an Appendix
a few additional examples to bring out the scope of the problem.
The examples above, however, do not cover the whole field. Consider the
effect of discovery of new oil or gas resources (Alaska), the impact of sudden
new technology that makes existing plants obsolete (coke-oven gas when natural
gas lines expanded), action of foreign governments (the copper companies), and
so on. The items mentioned had such impact on investors that they superseded
the reported earnings as a factor influencing investor behavior, sometimes over
a period of years.
My rule of "lower of the standard distortion factor or materiality factor"
simplifies the problem by at least 50 per cent. The accountant need only concern
himself with the situation where the materiality factor is lower—not higher—
than the distortion factor. That is, the accounting data must be more important
than usual and, as influencing the investor, these situations are usually within
the ken of the accountant.
And what of the other 50 per cent? I believe we have a way to go before
we can come close to standardizing that. Much of stock market response is
still pure Barnum & Bailey, a circus where W. C. Fields rates equal time with
Graham & Dodd. I will close with the same paragraph I used to close my
earlier article.
By all means let us continue to discuss, dispute, dissect, deplore, and generally "look before and after and pine for what is not" in this matter of materiality.
My personal opinion is that we must widen our understanding and narrow our
judgments—short of official standards.
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Appendix
Some Interesting Examples Showing Problems in Determining
Materiality Purely in Terms of Financial Statements
Cases relatively insensitive to present earnings:
From Newsweek—March 6, 1972:
(a) Curtis Wright has doubled in price since January 1 and in one week
alone nearly 30% of its shares were traded—all because the company hold limited North American rights to the Wankel engine,
and on the fragile theory that the major automakers may turn to
the Wankel and suddenly transform Curtis-Wright, one of the
market's perennial laggards, into a hot property.
(b) Cartridge Television, Inc.
At current prices the stock market was saying the company was
worth close to $75 million. Yet Cartridge T.V. not only hasn't
made any profits, it isn't even scheduled to make its first sale until
this month. But the company's story is that it hopes to cash in on
a long-time dream—a massive consumer market for video recorders
and video cassette players.
Cases particularly sensitive to earnings:
From Newsweek—July 26, 1971:
When IBM reported that its second-quarter net was unchanged from a
year ago at $2.22 a share—and added that the outlook for the rest of
the year wasn't exciting—investors stampeded for the exit. The stock
slumped 13 points in a single day, continued to drift lower and finally
closed the week at $294-1/2 vs. the 1971 high of almost $366.
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